We study pricing and superhedging strategies for game options in an imperfect market with default. We extend the results obtained by Kifer in [23] in the case of a perfect market model to the case of an imperfect market with default, when the imperfections are taken into account via the nonlinearity of the wealth dynamics. We introduce the seller's price of the game option as the infimum of the initial wealths which allow the seller to be superhedged. We prove that this price coincides with the value function of an associated generalized Dynkin game, recently introduced in [14], expressed with a nonlinear expectation induced by a nonlinear BSDE with default jump. We moreover study the existence of superhedging strategies. We then address the case of ambiguity on the model, -for example ambiguity on the default probability -and characterize the robust seller's price of a game option as the value function of a mixed generalized Dynkin game. We study the existence of a cancellation time and a trading strategy which allow the seller to be super-hedged, whatever the model is.
Introduction
Game options, which have been introduced by Kifer (2000) [23] , are derivative contracts that can be terminated by both counterparties at any time before a maturity date T . More precisely, a game option allows the seller to cancel it and the buyer to exercise it at any stopping time smaller than T . If the buyer exercises at time τ before the seller cancels, then the seller pays the buyer the amount ξ τ , but if the seller cancels before the buyer exercises, then he pays the amount ζ σ ≥ ξ τ to the buyer at the cancellation time σ. The difference ζ σ − ξ σ is interpreted as a penalty that the seller pays to the buyer for the cancellation of the contract. In short, if the buyer selects an exercise time τ and the seller selects a cancellation time σ, then the latter pays to the former the payoff ξ τ 1 τ ≤σ + ζ σ 1 τ >σ at time τ ∧ σ.
In the case of classical perfect markets, Kifer introduces the "fair price" of the game option, defined as the minimum initial wealth needed for the seller to cover his liability to pay the payoff to the buyer until a cancellation time, whatever is the exercise time chosen by the buyer. He shows both in the CCR discrete-time model and in the Black and Scholes model that this price is equal to the value function of the following Dynkin game:
(1.1)
whereξ t andζ t are the discounted values of ξ t and ζ t , equal to e −rt ξ t and e −rt ζ t respectively in the Black and Scholes model, where r is the instantaneous interest rate. Here, E Q denotes the expectation under the unique martingale probability measure Q of the market model. Further research on the pricing of game options and on more sophisticated gametype financial contracts includes in particular papers by Dolinsky and Kifer (2007) [12] and Dolinsky and al. (2011) [11] in the discrete time case, and by Hamadène (2006) [18] in a continuous time perfect market model with continuous payoffs ξ and ζ. We also mention the paper by Bielecki and al. (2009) [3] which studies the pricing of game options in a market model with default. Note that in [22] , Kallsen and Kuhn (2004) study game options in an incomplete market. They consider another type of pricing called neutral valuation via utility maximization.
The aim of the present paper is to study pricing and hedging issues for game options in the case of imperfections in the market model taken into account via the nonlinearity of the wealth dynamics, modeled via a nonlinear driver g. We moreover include the possibility of a default. A large class of imperfect market models can fit in our framework, like different borrowing and lending interest rates, or taxes on the profits from risky investments. Our model also includes the case when the seller of the option is a "large trader" whose hedging strategy may affect the market prices and the default probability.
Here, we suppose that the payoffs ξ and ζ associated with the game option are rightcontinuous left-limited (RCLL) only and they satisfy Mokobodzki's condition. We call seller's price of the game option, the infimum (denoted by u 0 ) of the initial wealths such that there exists a cancellation time σ and a portfolio strategy which allow the seller to pay ξ τ (at time τ ) to the buyer if the buyer exercises at any time τ ≤ σ, and ζ σ (at time σ) if the buyer has still not exercise at time σ. Note that this infimum is not necessarily attained. We provide a characterization of the seller's price u 0 of the game option as the (common) value of a corresponding generalized Dynkin game (recently introduced in [14] ). More precisely, we show that
(1. 2) where E g is a nonlinear expectation/evaluation induced by a nonlinear BSDE with default jump solved under the primitive probability measure P with driver g. Note that in the particular case of a perfect market, the driver g is linear and one can show by using an actualization procedure and a change of probability measure that (1.2) corresponds to (1.1). We prove that, under an additional left-regularity assumption on ζ (but not on ξ), there exist a cancellation time and a trading strategy which allow the seller to be super-hedged. In this case, the infimum in the definition of the seller's price u 0 is attained. When ζ is only RCLL, the infimum is not necessarily attained. However, we show that for each ε > 0, the amount u 0 allows the seller to be super-hedged up to ε until a well chosen cancellation time. The proofs of these results rely on the links between generalized Dynkin games and nonlinear doubly reflected BSDEs with default jump.
The second main question we study is the pricing and superhedging problem of game options in the case of uncertainty on the (imperfect) market model. To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been studied in the literature except by Dolinsky (2014) in [10] in a discrete time framework. In particular, our model can take into account an ambiguity on the default probability as illustrated in Section 4.3. We prove that the robust seller's price of the game option under uncertainty, defined as the infimum of the initial wealths with allow the seller to be superhedged whatever the model is, coincides with the value function of a mixed generalized Dynkin game. We also study the existence of robust superhedging strategies.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce our imperfect market model with default and nonlinear wealth dynamics. In Section 3, we study pricing and superhedging of game options and their links with generalized Dynkin games. In Section 4, we address the case of an imperfect market with model ambiguity. Section 5 provides some complementary results concerning the buyer's point of view and the case with dividends. Some results on doubly reflected BSDEs with default jumps and a useful lemma of analysis are given in Appendix.
2 Imperfect market model with default
Market model with default
Let (Ω, G, P ) be a complete probability space equipped with two stochastic processes: a unidimensional standard Brownian motion W and a jump process N defined by N t = 1 ϑ≤t for any t ∈ [0, T ], where ϑ is a random variable which models a default time. We assume that this default can appear at any time that is P (ϑ ≥ t) > 0 for any t ≥ 0. We denote by G = {G t , t ≥ 0} the augmented filtration that is generated by W and N (in the sense of [9, ). We suppose that W is a G-Brownian motion. We denote by P the G-predictable σ-algebra. Let (Λ t ) be the predictable compensator of the nondecreasing process (N t ). Note that (Λ t∧ϑ ) is then the predictable compensator of (N t∧ϑ ) = (N t ). By uniqueness of the predictable compensator, Λ t∧ϑ = Λ t , t ≥ 0 a.s. We assume that Λ is absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue's measure, so that there exists a nonnegative process λ, called the intensity process, such that Λ t = t 0 λ s ds, t ≥ 0. Since Λ t∧ϑ = Λ t , λ vanishes after ϑ. We denote by M the compensated martingale which satisfies
Let T > 0 be the finite horizon. We introduce the following sets:
Moreover, T denotes the set of stopping times τ such that τ ∈ [0, T ] a.s. and for each S in T , T S is the set of stopping times τ such that S ≤ τ ≤ T a.s.
We recall the martingale representation theorem (see e.g. [19] ):
1)
where z = (z t ) 0≤t≤T and l = (l t ) 0≤t≤T are predictable such that the two above stochastic integrals are well defined. If m is a square integrable martingale, then z ∈ H 2 and l ∈ H 2 λ . We consider now a financial market with three assets with price process S = (S 0 , S 1 , S 2 ) ′ governed by the equation:
The process S 0 = (S 0 t ) 0≤t≤T corresponds to the price of a non risky asset with interest rate process r = (r t ) 0≤t≤T , S 1 = (S 1 t ) 0≤t≤T to a non defaultable risky asset, and S 2 = (S 2 t ) 0≤t≤T to a defaultable asset with total default. The price process S 2 vanishes after ϑ.
All the processes σ 1 , σ 2 , r, µ 1 , µ 2 are predictable (that is P-measurable). We set σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ′ . We make the following assumptions:
We consider an investor, endowed with an initial wealth equal to x, who can invest his wealth in the three assets of the market. At each time t < ϑ, he chooses the amount ϕ 1 t (resp. ϕ 2 t ) of wealth invested in the first (resp. second) risky asset. However, after time ϑ, the investor cannot invest his wealth in the defaultable asset since its price is equal to 0, and he only chooses the amount ϕ 1 t of wealth invested in the first risky asset. Note that the process ϕ 2 can be defined on the whole interval [0, T ] by setting
is called a risky assets stategy if it belongs to H 2 × H 2 λ . We denote by V x,ϕ t (or simply V t ) the wealth, or equivalently the value of the portfolio, at time t. The amount invested in the non risky asset at time t is then given by
The perfect market model. In the classical case of a perfect market model, the wealth process and the strategy satisfy the self financing condition:
Consider a European contingent claim with maturity T > 0 and payoff ξ which is G T measurable, belonging to L 2 . The problem is to price and hedge this claim by constructing a replicating portfolio. From [15, Proposition 2.6 ], there exists an unique process (X, Z, K) ∈ S 2 × H 2 × H 2 λ solution of the following BSDE with default jump:
The solution (X, Z, K) provides the replicating portfolio. More precisely, the process X corresponds to its value, and the hedging risky assets stategy ϕ ∈ H 2 λ is given by ϕ = Φ(Z, K), where Φ is the one to one map defined on
Note that the processes ϕ 2 and K, which belong to H 2 λ , both vanish after time ϑ. The process X coincides with V X 0 ,ϕ , the value of the portfolio associated with initial wealth x = X 0 and portfolio strategy ϕ. From the seller's point of view, this portfolio is a hedging portfolio. Indeed, by investing the initial amount X 0 in the reference assets along the strategy ϕ, the seller can pay the amount ξ to the buyer at time T (and similarly at each initial time t). We derive that X t is the price at time t of the option, called hedging price, and denoted by X t (ξ). By the representation property of the solution of a λ-linear BSDE with default jump (see [15, Theorem 2.13 ]), we have that the solution X of BSDE (2.3) can be written as follows:
This defines a linear price system X: ξ → X(ξ). Suppose now that
Then ζ t,· > 0. Let Q be the probability measure which admits ζ 0,T as density on G T . Using Girsanov's theorem, it can be shown that Q is the unique martingale probability measure.In this case, the price system X is increasing and corresponds to the classical arbitrage free price system (see [19, 4, 3] ).
Remark 2.4. We have presented above the case of a defaultable asset with total default. A different model for the asset price S 2 (see e.g. [19, Chapter 7, Section 9.3]) could be considered:
where β t = 0 and β t > −1, with β t , β −1 t bounded. In this case, the price does not vanish after the default time ϑ. We suppose that
Let ζ 0,· be defined by (2.5) with
The assumption (2.7) ensures that the probability measure Q with ζ 0,T as density on G T is the unique martingale probability measure. The arbitrage free price of the contingent claim ξ is given by (2.4) and satisfies BSDE (2.3); moreover, the hedging strategy ϕ = (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) is given by:
The imperfect market model M g . From now on, we assume that there are imperfections in the market which are taken into account via the nonlinearity of the dynamics of the wealth. More precisely, the dynamics of the wealth V associated with strategy ϕ = (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) can be written via a nonlinear driver, defined as follows:
(ω, t, y, z, k) → g(ω, t, y, z, k) which is P ⊗ B(R 3 )− measurable, and such that g(., 0, 0, 0) ∈ H 2 . A driver g is called a λ-admissible driver if moreover there exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that dP ⊗ dt-a.s. , for each (y 1 , z 1 , k 1 ), (y 2 , z 2 , k 2 ),
The positive real C is called the λ-constant associated with driver g.
Note that condition (2.8) implies that for each t > ϑ, since λ t = 0, g does not depend on k. In other terms, for each (y, z, k), we have: g(t, y, z, k) = g(t, y, z, 0), t > ϑ dP ⊗ dt-a.s. Let x ∈ R be the initial wealth and let ϕ = (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 ) in H 2 × H 2 λ be a portfolio strategy. We suppose that the associated wealth process V x,ϕ t (or simply V t ) satisfies the following dynamics:
with V 0 = x. Since g is lipschitz with respect to y, this formulation makes sense. Indeed, setting
(ω)) is defined as the unique solution of the following deterministic differential equation:
Note that, equivalently, setting Z t = ϕ t ′ σ t and K t = −ϕ 2 t , the dynamics (2.9) of the wealth process V t can be written as follows:
(2.11)
In the following, our imperfect market model is denoted by M g . Note that in the case of a perfect market (see (2. 3)), we have:
which is a λ-admissible driver by Assumption 2.2.
A nonlinear pricing system
Pricing and hedging European options in the imperfect market M g leads to BSDEs with nonlinear driver g and a default jump. By [15, Proposition 2.6], we have Proposition 2.6. Let g be a λ-admissible driver, let ξ ∈ L 2 (G T ). There exists an unique solution (X(T, ξ), Z(T, ξ), K(T, ξ)) (denoted simply by (X, Z, K)) in S 2 × H 2 × H 2 λ of the following BSDE:
(2.13)
Let us consider a European option with maturity T and terminal payoff ξ ∈ L 2 (G T ) in this market model. Let (X, Z, K) be the solution of BSDE (2.13). The process X is equal to the wealth process associated with initial value x = X 0 , strategy ϕ = Φ(Z, K) (where Φ is defined in Definition 2.3) that is X = V X 0 ,ϕ . Its initial value X 0 = X 0 (T, ξ) is thus a sensible price (at time 0) of the claim ξ for the seller since this amount allows him/her to construct a trading strategy ϕ ∈ H 2 × H 2 λ , called hedging strategy (for the seller), such that the value of the associated portfolio is equal to ξ at time T . Moreover, by the uniqueness of the solution of BSDE (2.13), it is the unique price (at time 0) which satisfies this hedging property. Similarly, X t = X t (T, ξ) satisfies an analogous property at time t, and is called the hedging price at time t. This leads to a nonlinear pricing system, first introduced by El Karoui-Quenez ( [17] ) in a Brownian framework (later called g-evaluation in [24] ) and denoted by
In order to ensure the (strict) monotonicity and the no arbitrage property of the nonlinear pricing system E g , we make the following assumption (see [15, Section 3.3] ). Assumption 2.7. Assume that there exists a bounded map
14)
and P -a.s. , for each (y, z, k 1 ,
This assumption is satisfied e.g. when g(t, ·) is non decreasing with respect to k, or if g is C 1 in k with ∂ k g(t, ·) > −λ t on {t ≤ ϑ}. In the special case of a perfect market, g is given by (2.12), which implies that ∂ k g(t, ·) = −θ 2 t λ t . In this case, Assumption 2.7 is thus equivalent to θ 2 t < 1, which corresponds to the usual assumption (2.6) made in the literature on default risk.
Remark 2.8. Suppose that g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0 dP ⊗ dt-a.s. Then the price of an option with a null payoff is equal to 0, that is, for each S ∈ [0, T ], E g ·,S (0) = 0 a.s. Moreover, by the comparison theorem for BSDEs with default jump (see [15, Theorem 2.17] ), it follows that the
Moreover, for each x ∈ R and each portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H 2 × H 2 λ , the associated wealth process V x,ϕ is an E g -martingale.
Proof. By the flow property of BSDEs, the solution of a BSDE with driver g is an E gmartingale. The first assertion follows. The second one is obtained by noting that V x,ϕ is the solution of the BSDE with driver g, terminal time T and terminal condition V x,ϕ T .
Example 2.11 (Examples of market imperfections).
• Different borrowing and lending interest rates R t and r t , with R t ≥ r t : the driver g is then of the form
Pricing and hedging of game options in the imperfect market M g Let T > 0 be the terminal time. Let ξ and ζ be adapted RCLL processes in S 2 with ζ T = ξ T a.s. and ξ t ≤ ζ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. We suppose that Mokobodzki's condition is satisfied, that is there exist two nonnegative RCLL supermartingales H and H ′ in S 2 such that:
The game option consists for the seller to select a cancellation time σ ∈ T and for the buyer to choose an exercise time τ ∈ T , so that the seller pays to the buyer at time τ ∧ σ the amount
We now introduce the seller's price of the game option, denoted by u 0 , defined as the infimum of the initial wealths which enable the seller to choose a cancellation time σ and to construct a portfolio which will cover his liability to pay the payoff to the buyer up to σ no matter the exercise time chosen by the buyer. Definition 3.1. For each initial wealth x, a super-hedge against the game option is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and a portfolio strategy
We denote by S(x) = S ξ,ζ (x) the set of all super-hedges associated with initial wealth x.
We define the seller's price as
When the infimum in (3.2) is attained, the amount u 0 allows the seller to be super-hedged, and is called the superhedging price.
Moreover, when g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0 dP ⊗ dt-a.s. and ζ ≥ 0, then we can restrict ourselves to nonnegative initial wealths, that is
We now provide a dual formulation of the seller's price, expressed in terms of the nonlinear pricing system E g .We introduce the following definition: Definition 3.3. We define the g-value of the game option as
Our aim is to show that the seller's price u 0 of the game option is equal to its g-value. To this purpose, we first give the following characterization of the g-value. 
of the doubly reflected BSDE (DRBSDE) associated with driver g and barriers ξ, ζ, that is
Using the terminology introduced in [14] , the first equality in (3.4) means that the generalized Dynkin game associated with the criterium E g 0,τ ∧σ [I(τ, σ)] is fair. When g is linear and when there is no default, this corresponds to a well-known result on classical Dynkin games and linear DRBSDEs (see e.g. [8, 18] ).
Proof. The proof of existence and uniqueness of a solution (Y, Z, K, A, A ′ ) of the DRBSDE (3.5) is given in appendix. Proceeding as in the proof of [14, Theorem 4.9] which was given in the framework of a random Poisson measure, we can prove that for each S ∈ T , Proof. Note first that for each predictable stopping time τ , by (3.5), we have (∆Y τ ) + = ∆A ′ τ a.s. and (∆Y τ ) − = ∆A τ a.s. Suppose that now that −ζ is left-u.s.c. along stopping time. Let τ be a predictable stopping time. Using the equality ∆A ′ τ = (∆Y τ ) + together with the Skorokhod conditions satisfied by A ′ , we get
where the last equality follows from the inequality Y ≤ ζ. Using (3.6), we derive that ∆A ′ τ = 0 a.s. It follows that A ′ is continuous. By similar arguments, one can show that if ξ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times, then A is continuous.
Using the above propositions, we can now show the dual formulation for the seller's price. We first consider the simpler case when ζ is left lower-semicontinuous (or equivalently −ζ is left-u.s.c.) along stopping times. In this case, we prove below that the seller's price is equal to the g-value and that the infimum in (3.2) is attained. This implies that the seller's price is the super-hedging price. Moreover, a super-hedge strategy is provided via the solution of the associated DRBSDE. Theorem 3.6 (Seller's/super-hedging price and super-hedge of the game option). Suppose that ζ is left lower-semicontinuous along stopping times (and ξ is only RCLL). The seller's price (3.2) of the game option coincides with the g-value of the game option, that is
Let (Y, Z, K, A, A ′ ) is the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver g and barriers ξ, ζ. The seller's price is equal to Y 0 , that is
Moreover, the infimum in (3.2) is attained. The seller's price is thus the super-hedging price and there exists a super-hedge strategy (σ * , ϕ * ) associated with the initial amount u 0 , given by
Remark 3.7. In the special case of a perfect market model, our result gives that u 0 is characterized as the value function of a classical Dynkin game problem, which is shown in the literature (see e.g. [23, 18] ) under an additional regularity assumption on ξ, by using an actualization procedure, a change of probability measure, and some results on classical Dynkin games. Moreover, in this particular case, the characterization of u 0 and of the super-hedge via the solution of a linear doubly reflected BSDE are shown in [18] by using the links between linear DRBSDEs and classical Dynkin games (first provided in [8] ). To solve the problem in the case of an imperfect market model, when g is nonlinear, we need to use other arguments, in particular some properties of the nonlinear g-evaluation E g , comparison theorems for backward SDEs and for forward differential equations, and the links between nonlinear doubly reflected BSDEs and generalized Dynkin games (first provided in [14] ).
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the g-value of the game option is equal Y 0 . Note that u 0 = inf H, where H is the set of initial capitals which allow the seller to be super-hedged, that is
Let us show that Y 0 ≥ u 0 . It is sufficient to prove that there exists (σ * , ϕ * ) ∈ S(Y 0 ). By Proposition 3.5, since −ζ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times, the process A ′ is continuous. Let σ * be defined as in (3.8 
, associated with the initial capital Y 0 and the financial strategy ϕ * := Φ(Z, K) satisfies for almost every ω the forward deterministic differential equation:
(3.10)
Since A is non decreasing, by applying the classical comparison result on [0, σ * (ω)] (see e.g. Lemma 6.2) for the two forward differential equations (3.9) and (3.10), with the same
where the last inequality follows from the inequality Y ≥ ξ. We also have
where the last equality follows from the definition of the stopping time σ * and the rightcontinuity of Y and ζ. Hence, By taking the E g -evaluation in the above inequality and then the supremum on τ ∈ T , using the monotonicity of the E g -evaluation and the E g -martingale property of the wealth process V x,ϕ (see Proposition 2.10), we obtain
, for each τ ∈ T . By taking the supremum over τ ∈ T , and then the infimum over σ ∈ T , we get
This inequality holds for any x ∈ H. By taking the infimum over x ∈ H, we obtain the inequality (3.12), which yields that u 0 ≥ Y 0 . Since Y 0 ≥ u 0 , we get Y 0 = u 0 . Moreover, this equality together with (3.11) implies that (σ * , ϕ * ) ∈ S(u 0 ). The proof is thus complete.
Remark 3.8. Letσ be a stopping time such that A ′σ = 0 a.s. and Yσ = ζσ a.s. By the above proof, the pair (σ, ϕ * ) is a super-hedge for the initial amount u 0 , that is (σ, ϕ * ) ∈ S(u 0 ). For example, under the assumption of Theorem 3.6 (that is, the left-u.s.c. property along stopping times of −ζ), the stopping timeσ := inf{t ≥ 0 : A ′ t > 0} satisfies these two equalities. Note thatσ ≥ σ * . In general, the equality does not hold. Remark 3.9. Note that under the assumption of Theorem 3.6, there does not necessarily exist a saddle point for the generalized Dynkin game (3.4) . However, if we suppose additionally that ξ is left-u.s.c. along stopping time, there exists a saddle point. More precisely, in this case, by [14, Theorem 4.7] , the pair (τ * , σ * ), with σ * defined in (3.8) and τ * := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y t = ξ t }, is a saddle point for the generalized Dynkin game (3.4) , that is, for all (τ, σ) ∈ T 2 we have
, which implies that τ * is optimal for the optimal stopping problem sup τ ∈T E g [I(τ, σ * )]. The same properties also hold for the pair (τ ,σ) whereτ := inf{t ≥ 0 : A t > 0}.
We consider now the general case when ζ is only RCLL (as ξ). In this case, the seller's price u 0 is still equal to the g-value but it does not necessarily allow the seller to build a super-hedge against the option. We introduce the definition of ε-super-hedges: Definition 3.10. For each initial wealth x and for each ε > 0, an ε-super-hedge against the game option is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and a risky-assets strategy ϕ ∈
In other terms, by investing the initial capital amount x in the market following the riskyassets strategy ϕ, the seller is completely hedged before σ, and at the cancellation time σ, he is hedged up to an amount of ε.
We prove below that when ζ and ξ are only RCLL, the seller's price u 0 is equal to the g-value and that there exits an ε-super-hedge for the game option. 
Let (Y, Z, K, A, A ′ ) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver g and barriers ξ, ζ. The seller's price is equal to Y 0 , that is
The infimum in (3.2) is not nessarily attained. Let ϕ * := Φ(Z, K) and for each ε > 0, let
The pair (σ ε , ϕ * ) is an ε-super-hedge for the initial capital u 0 .
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the g-value is equal Y 0 . Let ε > 0. We have Y . ≤ ζ . − ε on [0, σ ε [. Since A ′ satisfies the Skorohod condition (iii), it follows that almost surely,
s. , which implies that ∆A ′ σε = 0 a.s. Hence, A ′ σ ε = 0 a.s. It follows that for almost every ω, the deterministic function Y . (ω) is the solution of the forward deterministic differential equation (3.9) on [0, σ ε (ω)]. Now, for almost every ω, the wealth V Y 0 ,ϕ * .
(ω) is the solution of the deterministic differential equation (3.10). By applying the classical comparison result on differential equations (Lemma 6.2), we derive that 
where K is a constant which only depends on T and the λ-constant C. By the comparison theorem for BSDEs,
allows the seller to be super-hedged, and the associated super-hedge is given by σ ε and ϕ ′ := Φ(Z ′ , K ′ ). By definition of u 0 , we derive that
Pricing and hedging of game options with model uncertainty
We study now game options with uncertainty on the model, which includes in particular the case of uncertainty on the default probability (see Example 4.3 below).
Market model with ambiguity
In this section, we need to use a measurable selection theorem, which requires to work on an appropriate probability space. We consider a Cox process model, which is a typical example of default model. We work on the canonical space constructed as follows: let Ω W be the Wiener space defined by Ω W := C(R + ), that is the set of continuous functions ω from R + into R such that ω(0) = 0. Recall that Ω W is a Polish space for the norm · ∞ . The space Ω W is equipped with the σ-algebra F W generated by the coordinate process (W t ) t≥0 (which is equal to its Borelian σ-algebra). Let P W be the probability under which (W t ) t≥0 is a standard Brownian motion. Let Ω Θ := R, equipped with its Borelian σ-algebra F Θ = B(R), and the probability P Θ such that the identity map Θ admits an exponential law with parameter 1. We consider the product space Ω := Ω W × Ω Θ , which is a Polish space. It is equipped with the σ-algebra F W ⊗ F Θ , and the probability P := P W ⊗ P Θ . Let G be the σ-algebra F W ⊗ F Θ completed with respect to P . Let F = (F t , t ≥ 0) be the filtration F W completed with respect to G and P (in the sense of [20, p.3] or [9, IV] ). Let (λ t ) t≥0 be a bounded positive F-predictable process. We introduce the following random variable, which represents the default time:
, which corresponds to the so-called condition (H) (see e.g. [19] ). We now define the default process:
We denote by G = (G t , t ≥ 0) the filtration generated by W and N augmented with respect to G and P (in the sense of [9, IV-48]). By classical results, since Condition (H) holds, we derive that W is a G-Brownian motion. Moreover, the process M defined by
is a G-martingale. For each t ≥ 0, let λ t :=λ t 1 {t≤ϑ} . The process λ, usually called the G-intensity of ϑ, thus vanishes after ϑ. Let T be a given terminal time. The sets P, S 2 , H 2 , H 2 λ and A 2 are defined as before. Let U be a nonempty closed subset of R. Let g : [0, T ]×Ω×R 3 ×U → R ; (t, ω, y, z, k, α) → g(t, ω, y, z, k, α), be a given P ⊗ B(R 3 ) ⊗ B(U)-measurable function. Suppose g(·, α) is uniformly λ-admissible with respect to (y, z, k), that satisfies the inequality (2.8) with a constant C which does not depend on α. We also assume that g(·, α) is continuous with respect to α, and such that sup α∈U |g(t, ., 0, 0, 0, α)| ∈ H 2 . Suppose also that g(t, y, z, k 1 , α) − g(t, y, z, k 2 , α) ≥ θ y,z,k 1 ,k 2 t (k 1 − k 2 )λ t ,
(4.1)
where θ y,z,k 1 ,k 2 t satisfies the conditions of Assumption 2.7, in particular the inequality θ y,z,k 1 ,k 2 t > −1.
Let U be the set of U-valued predictable processes. For each α ∈ U, to simplify notation, we introduce the map g α defined by g α (t, ω, y, z, k) := g(t, ω, y, z, k, α t (ω)).
(4.2)
Note that these maps g α , α ∈ U, are all λ-admissible drivers with the same λ-constant C. The control α represents the ambiguity parameter of the model. To each ambiguity parameter α, corresponds a market model M α where the wealth process V α,x,ϕ associated with an initial wealth x and a risky assets stategy ϕ ∈
In the market model M α , the nonlinear pricing system is given by E g α := {E g α t,S , S ∈ [0, T ], t ∈ [0, S]}, also called g α -evaluation.
Robust superhedging of game options
In our framework with ambiguity, the seller's robust price of the game option denoted by u 0 is defined as the infimum of the initial wealths which enable the seller to be superhedged for any ambiguity parameter α ∈ U. We denote by S r (x) the set of all robust super-hedges associated with initial wealth x.
The seller's robust price is defined as 3
When the infimum is reached, u 0 is called the robust superhedging price.
Let α ∈ U. By Theorem 3.11, the seller's price of the game option in the market M α is characterized as its g α -value.
of the DRBSDE associated with driver g α and barriers ξ and ζ. We now introduce an associated dual problem. By Theorem 3.11, the seller's price Y α 0 of the game option in the market M α is equal to the common value function of the generalized Dynkin game associated with driver g α , that is,
Hence, the value function v 0 of the dual problem is equal to the value function of a mixed generalized Dynkin game, that is
Remark 4.3. We shall see below (see Proposition 4.8) that v 0 is also equal to:
In order to show that u 0 = v 0 , we will first prove that v 0 can be characterized as the solution of a doubly reflected BSDE. Now, by definition, we have v 0 = sup α Y α 0 , where Y α is the solution of the doubly reflected BSDE associated with barriers ξ and ζ, and with driver g(·, α t ). We will show that v 0 coincides with the solution of the doubly reflected BSDE associated with the same barriers ξ and ζ, and with the driver sup α g(·, α).
More precisely, let G be the map defined for each (t, ω, z, k) by G(t, ω, y, z, k) := sup α∈U g(t, ω, y, z, k, α). Proof. Since U is a closed subset of a Polish space, there exists a numerable subset D of U, dense in U. Since g is continuous with respect to u, the supremum in (4.8) can be taken in D. It follows that G is P ⊗ B(R 3 )− measurable. Let us show that G satisfies Assumption (2.7). By definition of G(t, y, z, k 1 ) and by Assumption (4.1), we have for all α ∈ U:
Taking the infimum on α ∈ U in this inequality, and using the definition of G(t, y, z, k 2 ), we derive that G(t, y, z, k 1 ) − G(t, y, z, k 2 ) ≥ θ y,z,k 1 ,k 2 t (k 1 − k 2 )λ t , which gives the desired result. The proof of condition (2.8) relies on similar arguments and is left to the reader. Hence, G is a λ-admissible driver.
We now prove that the dual function v 0 is characterized as the solution of the doubly reflected BSDE associated with driver G and barriers ξ and ζ. We have v 0 = Y 0 , where (Y, Z, K, A, A ′ ) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver G and barriers ξ and ζ. If U is compact, there existsᾱ ∈ U such that v 0 = Yᾱ 0 , which means that the dual value function v 0 is equal to the gᾱ-value of the game option in the market model Mᾱ.
Proof. By definition of G (see (4.8)), for each (t, ω, y, z, k) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω × R 3 × U, we have G(t, ω, y, z, k) ≥ g(t, ω, y, z, k, α t (ω)).
By the comparison theorem for DRBSDEs (see Theorem 5.1 in [14] ), we thus have Y ≥ Y α a.s. for each α ∈ U. It follows that Y 0 ≥ sup α Y α 0 . Let ε > 0. By definition of G as a supremum, for each (t, ω, y, z, l) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × R 2 × R, there exists α ε ∈ U such that G(t, ω, y, z, k) − ε ≤ g(t, ω, y, z, k, α ε ). Now, the set
belongs to P ⊗ B(U). Hence, since the canonical space Ω is a Polish space, by applying a measurable selection theorem (see e.g. [9, Section 81, Appendix of Ch. III]) and [5, Lemma 1.2] (or [13, Lemma 26]), there exists an U-valued predictable process (α ε t ) such that
By using the estimate (6.1) on DRBSDEs with default jump, with η = 1 C 2 and β = 3C 2 +2C, we derive that there exists a constant K ≥ 0, which depends only on C and T , such that, for each ε > 0,
Let us show the second assertion. If U is compact, for each (t, ω, y, z, l) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×R 2 ×L 2 λ , there existsᾱ ∈ U such that the supremum in (4.8) is attained atᾱ. By the measurable selection theorem of [9] and [5, Lemma 1.2], there exists an U-valued predictable process (ᾱ t ) such that
It follows that Y and Yᾱ are both solutions of the DRBSDE associated with driver gᾱ. Hence, by the uniqueness of the solution of a DRBSDE, Y = Yᾱ.
Using this result, we now provide the following theorem: 
Let (Y, Z, K, A, A ′ ) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver G defined by (4.8) and barriers ξ and ζ. The seller's robust price is equal to Y 0 , that is
Moreover, the infimum in (4.6) is attained. The robust seller's price is thus the robust superhedging price of the game option. Let σ * := inf{t ≥ 0, Y t = ζ t } and ϕ * := Φ(Z, K). The pair (σ * , ϕ * ) is a robust super-hedge for the initial capital u 0 .
If U is compact, there existsᾱ ∈ U such that the robust superhedging price of the game option is equal to the superhedging price in the market model Mᾱ, that is u 0 = Yᾱ 0 . The ambiguity parameterᾱ corresponds to a worst case scenario among all the possible ambiguity parameters α ∈ U.
Proof. By Theorem 4.5, v 0 = Y 0 . Let H r be the set of initial capitals which allow the seller to be super-hedged, that is H r = {x ∈ R : ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ S r (x)}. Note that u 0 = inf H r .
Let us show that Y 0 ≥ u 0 . It is sufficient to show that there exists (σ * , ϕ * ) ∈ S r (Y 0 ). By Proposition 3.5, since −ζ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times, the process A ′ is continuous. By definition of σ * , the process A ′ is constant on [0, σ * [ a.s. and even on [0, σ * ] by continuity. Hence, A ′ σ * = A ′ 0 = 0 a.s. We thus have
Let α ∈ U. In the market model M α , the wealth process V α,Y 0 ,ϕ * . associated with the initial capital Y 0 and the financial strategy ϕ * := Φ(Z, K) satisfies
By definition of G (see (4.8)), we have −g(t, ω, y, z, k, α t (ω)) ≥ −G(t, ω, y, z, k). Hence, since A is a non decreasing process, by the comparison property for deterministic differential equations (see Lemma 6.2) applied to the two above forward equations, we derive that
where the last inequality follows from the inequality Y ≥ ξ.
s. , and this holds for any α ∈ U.
Let us now show that u 0 ≥ Y 0 . Let x ∈ H r . There exists (σ, ϕ) ∈ S r (x), that is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and a portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H 2 × H 2 λ such that for each α ∈ U, we have V α,x,ϕ t∧σ ≥ I(t, σ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. By the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.6, we derive that for each α ∈ U,
By taking the supremum over α ∈ U in this inequality, we obtain
where the last equality follows from the fact that v 0 is equal to the value function of the mixed generalized Dynkin game (4.7). By taking the infimum over x ∈ H r , we obtain u 0 ≥ v 0 = Y 0 . Since Y 0 ≥ u 0 , we thus get Y 0 = u 0 . Since (σ * , ϕ * ) ∈ S r (Y 0 ), we derive that (σ * , ϕ * ) ∈ S r (u 0 ). The last assertion of the theorem follows from Theorem 4.5.
When ζ is only RCLL, by using similar arguments to those used in the above proof and in the proof of Theorem 3.11, one can show the following result. Moreover, the infimum in (4.6) is not necessarily attained. For each ε > 0, let σ ε := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y t ≥ ζ t − ε}. The pair (σ ε , ϕ * ), where ϕ * := Φ(Z, K), is an ε-robust super-hedge for the seller, in the sense that V α,u 0 ,ϕ * t ≥ ξ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ σ ε a.s. and V α,u 0 ,ϕ * σε ≥ ζ σε − ε a.s. ∀α ∈ U.
We will now show that the infimum over σ and the supremum over α can be interchanged in the expression of the dual value function v 0 (see (4.7)), which, since u 0 = v 0 , can be written as follows. Proof. The first equality in (4.9) holds by the above theorem. Let us prove the second one. By the above theorem, we have u 0 = Y 0 , where (Y, Z, K, A, A ′ ) is the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver G defined by (4.8) and barriers ξ and ζ. To obtain the desired result, it is thus sufficient to prove that
(4.10)
Since by definition (4.8), G = sup α∈U g(·, α), by using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Theorem 4.5 (in particular a measurable selection theorem), one can show that the solution of the BSDE associated with driver G and terminal condition I(τ, σ) is equal to the supremum over α of the solutions of the BSDEs associated with drivers g(·, α) and the same terminal condition, that is To each α ∈ U, corresponds a market model M α associated with the a priori probability By [15, Proposition 2.11] , (Z α T ) −1 belongs to L q ′ Q α for all q ′ ≥ 1, which implies that (Z α T ) −1 ∈ L q for all q ≥ 1. Since p ′ > 2, by Hölder's inequality, we derive that (X α , Z α , K α ) (solution of (4.14)) belongs to S 2 × H 2 × H 2 λ and is thus the unique solution in
Hence, for each maturity S and each payoff η ∈ L p (G S ), we have
which gives that E g α is equal to the nonlinear price system E f α Q α relative to the market model M α . Using this property together with equalities (4.15) and Theorem 4.7, we derive the following result. 
(4.16)
Let G be the map defined for each (t, ω, z, k) by
We have u 0 = Y 0 , where Y is the solution of the P -DRBSDE associated with driver G and barriers ξ and ζ.
Complementary results

Pricing of European options from the buyer's point of view
Let us consider the pricing and hedging problem of a European option with maturity T and payoff ξ ∈ L 2 (G T ) from the buyer's point of view. Supposing the initial price of the option is z, he starts with the amount −z at time t = 0, and looks to find a risky-assets strategyφ such that the payoff that he receives at time T allows him to recover the debt he incurred at time t = 0 by buying the option, that is such that V −z,φ T + ξ = 0 a.s. or equivalently,
The buyer's price of the option is thus equal to the opposite of the seller's price of the option with payoff −ξ, that is −E g 0,T (−ξ) = −X 0 , where (X,Z,K) is the solution of the BSDE associated with driver g and terminal condition −ξ. Let us specify the hedging strategy for the buyer. Suppose that the initial price of the option is z := −X 0 . The process X is equal to the value of the portfolio associated with initial value −z =X 0 and strategỹ ϕ := Φ(Z,K) (where Φ is defined in Definition 2.3) that isX = VX 0 ,φ = V −z,φ . Hence, V −z,φ T =X T = −ξ a.s. , which yields thatφ is the hedging risky-assets strategy for the buyer.
Similarly, −E g t,T (−ξ) = −X t satisfies an analogous property at time t, and is is called the hedging price for the buyer at time t.
This leads to the nonlinear pricing systemẼ g relative to the buyer in the market M g defined for each (S, ξ) ∈ [0, T ] × L 2 (G S ) bỹ E g ·,S (ξ) := −E g ·,S (−ξ).
(5.1)
Remark 5.1. When g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0, thenẼ g ·,S (0) = 0. Moreover, by the comparison theorem for BSDEs with default, if ξ ≥ 0, thenẼ g ·,S (ξ) ≥ 0. Note thatẼ g ·,S (ξ) is equal to the solution of the BSDE with driver −g(t, −y, −z, −k) and terminal condition ξ. Hence, if we suppose that −g(t, −y, −z, −k) ≤ g(t, y, z, k) (which is satisfied if, for example, g is convex with respect to (y, z, k)), then, by the comparison theorem for BSDEs, we haveẼ 4 Moreover, when −g(t, −y, −z, −k) = g(t, y, z, k) (which is satisfied if, for example, g is linear with respect to (y, z, k), as in the perfect market case), we haveẼ g = E g .
Pricing of the game option from the buyer's point of view
In this section, we consider the point of view of the buyer of the game option. Supposing the initial price of the game option is z, he starts with the amount −z at time t = 0, and looks to find a super-hedge, that is an exercise time τ and a risky-assets strategy ϕ, such that the payoff that he receives allows him to recover the debt he incurred at time t = 0 by buying the game option, no matter the cancellation time chosen by the seller. This notion of super-hedge for the buyer can be defined more precisely as follows. We denote by B ξ,ζ (z) the set of all buyer's super-hedges against the game option with payoffs (ξ, ζ) associated with initial price z ∈ R. The buyer's price of the game option in the market model M g , denoted byũ 0 , is defined as the supremum of the initial prices which allow the buyer to be super-hedged, that is 5
The first inequality of (5.2) also holds at time t = τ because ξ ≤ ζ. It follows that B ξ,ζ (z) = S −ζ,−ξ (−z), where S −ζ,−ξ (−z) is the set of seller's super-hedges against the game option with payoffs (−ζ, −ξ) associated with initial capital −z. Hence, −ũ 0 = inf{x ∈ R, ∃(τ, ϕ) ∈ S −ζ,−ξ (x)}. We thus have:
Theorem 5.3. The buyer's price of the game option with payoffs (ξ, ζ) is equal to the opposite of the seller's price of the game option with payoffs (−ζ, −ξ).
The previous results (Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.11) can thus be applied. In particular, we have the following dual formulation of the buyer's price: Remark 5.4. In the special case of a perfect market, the dynamics of the wealth process X are linear with respect to (X, ϕ), which implies that the buyer's priceũ 0 is equal to the seller's price u 0 (andẼ g = E g , as seen in Remark 5.1).
Let (Ỹ ,Z,K,Ã,Ã ′ ) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver g and barriers (−ζ, −ξ). By Theorem 3.11, the buyer's price is equal to the opposite of the solution, that is,ũ 0 = −Ỹ 0 .
Moreover, by Theorem 3.6, when ξ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times (but not necessarily −ζ), the pair (τ ,φ), whereτ := inf{t ≥ 0 : −Ỹ t = ξ t } andφ := Φ(Z,K), is a buyer's super-hedge.
Buyer's robust price of the game option in the case with ambiguity. In this paragraph, we consider the market model with ambiguity described in Section 4.1. We denote by B r ξ,ζ (z) the set of all buyer's robust super-hedges against the game option with payoffs (ξ, ζ) associated with initial price z ∈ R.
The buyer's robust price of the game option is defined as the supremum of the initial prices which allow the buyer to construct a robust superhedge, that is
Since ξ ≤ ζ, condition (5.5) is equivalent to
It follows that B r ξ,ζ (z) = S r −ζ,−ξ (−z), where S r −ζ,−ξ (−z) is the set of seller's robust superhedges against the game option with payoffs (−ζ, −ξ) associated with initial capital −z. We thus have Theorem 5.6. The buyer's robust price of the game option with payoffs (ξ, ζ) is equal to the opposite of the seller's robust price of the game option with payoffs (−ζ, −ξ).
The previous results (Theorem 4.6 and 4.7) can thus be applied. In particular, we have the following dual formulation of the buyer's robust price: Note that for each α ∈ U, the quantityẼ g α 0,τ ∧σ [I(τ, σ)] is the buyer's price in the market model M α of the European option with payoff I(τ, σ) and terminal time τ ∧ σ (see (5.1)).
Let (Ỹ ,Z,K,Ã,Ã ′ ) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver G defined by (4.8) and barriers (−ζ, −ξ). By Theorem 4.7, the buyer's robust price of the game option is equal to −Ỹ 0 , that is,ũ 0 = −Ỹ 0 . Moreover, by Theorem 4.6, when ξ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times (but not necessarily −ζ), the pair (τ ,φ), whereτ := inf{t ≥ 0 : −Ỹ t = ξ t } andφ := Φ(Z,K), is a buyer's robust super-hedge of the game option.
Seller's price and buyer's price processes of the game option
We can define the seller's price of the game option at each stopping time S ∈ T . More precisely, for each wealth X ∈ L 2 (F S ) (at initial time S), an S-super-hedge against the game option is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T S and a portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H 2 × H 2 λ such that V S,X,ϕ t ≥ ξ t , S ≤ t ≤ σ a.s. and V S,X,ϕ σ ≥ ζ σ a.s. , where V S,X,ϕ denotes the wealth process associated with initial time S and initial condition X. The seller's price at time S is defined by u(S) := ess inf{X ∈ L 2 (F S ), ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ S S (X)}, where S S (X) is the set of all S-super-hedges associated with initial wealth X. Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Theorem 3.11, we obtain: Similarly, we can define the buyer's price at time S.
Game options with intermediate dividends
Suppose that a European option pays a terminal payoff ξ at terminal time S and an intermediate dividend, modeled by a nondecreasing RCLL adapted process (D t ) with D 0 = 0. There exists an unique solution (X, Z, K) in S 2 × H 2 × H 2 λ of the following BSDE:
The process X is the wealth process associated with initial value x = X 0 and strategy ϕ = Φ(Z, K). Here, dD t represents the amount withdrawn from the portfolio between t and t + dt in order to pay the dividends to the buyer. Hence, the amount X 0 allows the seller to be perfectly hedged against the option, in the sense that it allows him/her to pay the intermediate dividends and the terminal payoff to the buyer, by investing the amount X 0 along the strategy ϕ in the market. The price for the seller (at time 0) of this option is thus given by X 0 and the associated hedging strategy is equal to ϕ. Note that the driver of BSDE (5.8) is given by the λ-admissible "generalized" driver g(t, X t , Z t , K t )dt + dD t . This leads to the following nonlinear pricing system: For each S ∈ [0, T ], for each ξ ∈ L 2 (G S ) and for each D ∈ A 2 , the associated g-value is defined by E (ξ) for t ≥ S, where g S (t, .) := g(t, .)1 t≤S and D S t := D t∧S . Some properties of this nonlinear pricing system are provided in [15] . Concerning the pricing of the game option, the approach is the same, replacing the driver g by the "generalized" driver g(·)dt + dD t , and E g by E g,D .
Appendix
We show the following estimates for DRBSDEs in our framework, with universal constants. Proposition 6.1 (A priori estimate for DRBSDEs). Let f 1 be a λ-admissible driver with λ-constant C and let f 2 be a driver. Let ξ and ζ be two adapted RCLL processes with ζ T = ξ T a.s., ξ ∈ S 2 , ζ ∈ S 2 , ξ t ≤ ζ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. , and satisfying Mokobodzki's condition. For i = 1, 2, let (Y i , Z i , K i , A i , A ′ i ) be a solution of the DRBSDE associated with terminal time T , driver f i and barriers ξ and ζ. Let η, β > 0 be such that β ≥ 3 η + 2C and η ≤ 1 
